ToxScreen: Detecting Whether an LLM Has Been Poisoned2607.26849AuthorsAndy Kim,Andrew Draganov,Anthony Hughes,Nicole Xing,Collin FrancelAbstractAs large language models (LLMs) are deployed in high-stakes domains, adversaries may poison training data to implant backdoors: hidden triggers that covertly manipulate model behavior at inference time. We ask whether a defender can recover such a trigger under realistic affordances, namely white-box access to the weights and knowledge of the behavior of concern, but no training data, no trusted reference model, no knowledge of the trigger, and no certainty that the model is poisoned. To evaluate whether a defender can recover such a trigger under realistic settings, we release ToxScreen, a benchmark of roughly 800 backdoored models spanning attack objectives, trigger mechanisms, poisoning rates, model scales, and backdoor training mechanisms. We also assert that the backdoors are high-quality: they achieve high attack success rates, generalize to unseen harmful inputs, and preserve clean-task performance. Scoring recovery of the planted trigger, we find that gradient-based prompt optimization fails in recovery, whereas a token look-up that ranks candidates by attack-success rate recovers the trigger wherever the backdoor is effective. To understand this more, we study the relationship between attack behaviors and the weights of an LLM. We find a phenomenon whereby backdoors operate via different mechanistic strategies than jailbreaks, allowing defenders to filter jailbreaks. Finally, no method reliably surfaces every backdoor, but a broadly jailbreakable model is itself anomalous, a useful signal even when the exact trigger is not recovered. We release all models and evaluation codeResourcesView on Hugging FaceRead PDFArXiv
ToxScreen: Detecting Whether an LLM Has Been Poisoned
As large language models (LLMs) are deployed in high-stakes domains, adversaries may poison training data to implant backdoors: hidden triggers that covertly...
Related
ResearchLearning When to Trust via Selective Context Preference Optimization
Language models increasingly condition their answers on external signals, and a single misleading one can turn a correct answer wrong. The obvious remedy, training models to resist such signals, hides a failure mode: a model that ignores all context looks robust yet is useless when the context is worth trusting. We recast the problem as selective trust and introduce MIST, a human-annotated benchmark that renders each reasoning item under four matched conditions (clean, misleading, correct-context, and irrelevant-context), together with SC2W, a paired metric counting how often a misle
Learning When to Trust via Selective Context Preference Optimization
Language models increasingly condition their answers on external signals, and a single misleading one can turn a correct answer wrong. The obvious remedy, tr...
ResearchTracing the Heart: An Evidence-Linked Pipeline for Heart-Failure Feature Engineering
Electronic health record (EHR) feature engineering is a major bottleneck in clinical research and AI, accounting for 39-45% of data scientists' workload. This is especially pronounced in heart failure, which affects an estimated 6.7 million U.S. adults and requires integrating fragmented EHR data with disease-specific, guideline-based clinical reasoning. Existing rule-based and large language model (LLM)-based approaches offer only partial automation with limited maintainability and evidence traceability. We developed the Nimblemind Multi-Agent System (nMAS), an evidence-linked, rubr